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HUMAN
ELEMENT

SESSION ID: CRYPT-110

My Gadget Just Cares For Me - How NINA Can Prove Security Against Combined Attacks



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
imec-COSIC, KU Leuven, Belgium

#RSAC


Embedded Security




Side Channel Analysis




The Probing Model




Modular Circuits




Simulation Based Security




Non-Interference




Non-Interference




Strong Non-Interference




Fault Analysis




The Fault Model




Non-Accumulation



The Combined Model



NINA



A NINA Gadget

Algorithm 2: Multiplying duplicated Boolean shared values


Input: Independent shares of a and b , and uniform random $r_{i,j}$

Output: Shares of ab or \perp

```

for  $\ell \leftarrow 1$  to  $k+1$  do
  for  $i \leftarrow 1$  to  $d+1$  do
     $u_{i,i,\ell} \leftarrow a_{i,\ell}b_{i,\ell}$ ;
    for  $j \leftarrow i+1$  to  $d+1$  do
       $u_{i,j,\ell} \leftarrow a_{i,\ell}b_{j,\ell} + r_{i,j}$ ;
       $u_{j,i,\ell} \leftarrow a_{j,\ell}b_{i,\ell} + r_{i,j}$ ;
    end
  end
end
for  $\ell \leftarrow 2$  to  $k+1$  do
  for  $i \leftarrow 1$  to  $d+1$  do
    for  $j \leftarrow 1$  to  $d+1$  do
       $t_{i,j,\ell} \leftarrow u_{i,j,1} + u_{i,j,\ell}$ ;
      if  $t_{i,j,\ell} = 1$  then return  $\perp$ ;
    end
  end
end
for  $\ell \leftarrow 1$  to  $k+1$  do
  for  $i \leftarrow 1$  to  $d+1$  do
     $c_{i,\ell} \leftarrow \sum_{j=1}^{d+1} u_{i,j,\ell}$ ;
  end
end
end
  
```

A NINA Gadget



Applying the NINA Framework

- Create an algorithmic expression of your cipher
- Divide the algorithm in smaller subcomponents
- To each component apply the NINA framework
- Combine all secure components

Secure implementation of the cipher!

Thanks!

Questions?