ANALYSIS OF COBALT ATTACKS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: SWIFT, PROCESSING, ATMS

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Cybercrime attacking financial institutions

2013
- ANUNAX: Internet Banking, ARM CBR, SWIFT, Payment Gateways, Card Processing, ATM

2014
- CORKOW: Trading Terminals, Card Processing, ATM

2015
- BURTRAP: ARM CBR (Swift Analog)

2016
- LURK: ARM CBR (Swift Analog)

2017
- COBALT: ATM, Card Processing, SWIFT, Payment Gateway
- MONEYTAKER: Card Processing, ARM CBR

2018
- SILENCE: ATM
# Cobalt Timeline

### 2016
- **January**: The first successful attack on card processing in Kazakhstan.
- **February**: Public Group-IB report about logical attacks on ATMs.
- **March**: Joint operation of theft through SWIFT in Hong Kong.
- **April**: Server activation & configuration used in SWIFT attack in Hong Kong.
- **May**: Joint operation of theft through SWIFT in Ukraine.
- **June**: Credit Dnepr Bank.
- **July**: Arrest of ML group for Buhrtrap.
- **August**: First attack in Russia.
- **September**: Attack on ATMs in Taiwan.
- **October**: First Bank.
- **November**: Begin preparation of attacks on card processing.
- **December**: Group-IB report about logical attacks on ATMs.

### 2017
- **January**: The first attack with ransomware: PetriWrap.
- **February**: Attacks on companies e-wallets and terminals.
- **March**: Improving the quality of phishing.
- **April**: Penetration into banks through Supply chain.
- **May**: Start testing of a new Reconnaissance backdoor (test.dll).
- **June**: The first attack on Payment gateways (e-wallet company).
- **July**: Using a unique program.
- **August**: First decoy documents.
- **September**: Joint operation with Anunak (Carbanak) tools to steal through a payment gateway.
- **October**: Active use of the new JS-backdoor v2.0 in attacks with English language phishing emails.
- **November**: First attack on Telecommunications company in Russia.
- **December**: Use of the new InfoStealer v. 0.2.
- **January**: Instant adaptation of 1-day exploits.
- **February**: Start to use SPF and DMIK.
- **March**: First theft through SWIFT in Russia.
- **April**: New Java-stager & 2-step infection.
- **May**: ATM attack after long pause in Russia.
SWIFT attacks

**Hong Kong incident**
- Attacker activated 2 servers on 20 March and 28 March
- 28 April 2016, unnamed bank in Hong Kong was robbed
- Bank used Customer-hosted SWIFT connectivity
- This took one month once inside the compromised bank for preparation and organization of money laundering
- Attack was sophisticated and to accomplish it attackers developed tools specifically for this bank

**Ukraine incident**
- April 2016, Credit Dnepr bank was robbed.
- Attackers sent out of the bank about $10 mln.
- Year later bank confirmed losses of $950 000 USD

**Russian incident**
- Globex bank - December 2017
- Attackers sent out about $6 mln. (339.5 mln. rub)
- SWIFT-specific malware was not identified.

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ATM attacks

Malicious program using standard functions for the XFS interface via the XFS Manager (eXtensions for Financial Services).

ATM incidents
- First attack was in Russia in June 2016
- Second attack was in Taiwan with First Bank. Mules withdraw more than $2 mln.
- We attributed this attack to Cobalt only in the end of 2016 base on malware comparison.
- There were no any further ATM attacks after November 2016 until December 2017.

ATM malware parameters
- ServiceLogicalName — a service name used as an argument for the WFSOpen function (for example, “Cash Dispenser Module”).
- Cassette Count — the total number of cassettes on the device. The value should be set in the interval from 1 to 15.
- Cassette Number — the number of the cassette, which should dispense cash. The value should be set in the interval from 1 to 15.
- Banknotes Count — the amount of banknotes to be dispensed from the cassette. The value should be set in the interval from 1 to 60.
- Dispenses Count — the number of times cash dispenses should be repeated. The value should be set in the interval from 1 to 60.

```c
WriteLogMessage(
    "Using Params: Service Logical Name=%s | Cassette Count=%d | Cassette Number=%d | Banknotes Count=%d | Dispenses Count=%d\n", 
    ServiceLogicalNameArg, 
    CassettesCountArg, 
    CassetteNumberArg, 
    BanknotesCountArg, 
    DispensesCountArg); 
```
ATM attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Group-IB Analyst Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protection Mechanisms</td>
<td>Checking of launch month. If the current date does not coincide with September 2016, error message will be shown. Error message: WFSOpen failed with error: WFS_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR It corresponds with month of incident in Europe – Sep 2016</td>
<td>Checking of launch month. If the current date does not coincide with July 2016, error message will be shown. Error message: CscCngOpen/CscCdmOpen failed with error: System Failure It corresponds with month of incident in Taiwan – July 2016</td>
<td>The protection mechanisms correspond with the months of the incidents (in Europe – September 2016, in Taiwan – July 2016). The person who launched program didn’t know the real reason the program was not launched, only the developer knew and understands what this error means.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Identical parts of code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Group-IB Analyst Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>int v1; // esp+812</td>
<td>int v1; // esp+812</td>
<td>Both instances have identical code designed to record the dispensing results into an unencrypted file (disp.txt in European case, displog.txt in Taiwan). This is so that the exact amount of notes taken by money mules can be tracked during theft. This indicates the developer is using mules that they do not trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HANDLE v3; // esp+2</td>
<td>HANDLE v3; // esp+2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>int v4; // esp+816</td>
<td>int v4; // esp+816</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWORD NumberOfBytesWritten; // [esp+2Ch] [ebp-Ch]@1</td>
<td>DWORD NumberOfBytesWritten; // [esp+2Ch] [ebp-Ch]@1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>va_list va; // [esp+44h] [ebp+Ch]@1</td>
<td>va_list va; // [esp+44h] [ebp+Ch]@1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>va_start(va, a1); NumberOfBytesWritten = 0;</td>
<td>va_start(va, a1); NumberOfBytesWritten = 0;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v1 = lstrlenA(a1);</td>
<td>v1 = lstrlenA(a1);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2 = (CHAR *)malloc(v1 + 10240);</td>
<td>v2 = (CHAR *)malloc(v1 + 10240);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wvsprintfA(v2, a1, va);</td>
<td>wvsprintfA(v2, a1, va);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v3 = CreateFileA(&quot;disp.txt&quot;, 0x120116u, 3u, 0, 4u, 0, 0);</td>
<td>v3 = CreateFileA(&quot;disp.txt&quot;, 0x120116u, 3u, 0, 4u, 0, 0);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SetFilePointer(v3, 0, 0, 2u);</td>
<td>SetFilePointer(v3, 0, 0, 2u);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WriteFile(v3, v2, v4, &amp;NumberOfBytesWritten, 0);</td>
<td>WriteFile(v3, v2, v4, &amp;NumberOfBytesWritten, 0);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CloseHandle(v3);</td>
<td>CloseHandle(v3);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free(v2);</td>
<td>free(v2);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Error messages in incorrect arguments passing

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Group-IB Analyst Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If any of the arguments are outside the possible range, ATMSpitter displays error messages: Error! Banknotes Count should be from 1 to 60 Error! Cassette number should be from 1 to 15 Error! Cassette Count should be from 1 to 15 Error! Dispenses Count should be from 1 to 500</td>
<td>If any of the arguments are outside the possible range, ATMSpitter displays error messages: Invalid parameter: Cassette slot number. Must be a digit from 1 to 9 Invalid parameter: Banknotes Count. Must be a digit from 1 to 60</td>
<td>Analogous messages connected with «Cassette number» and «Banknotes Count»</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 Language errors in code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Group-IB Analyst Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developer uses words «cassettes», «banknotes»</td>
<td>Developer uses word «banknotes»</td>
<td>Typical usage by Russian-speaker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Card processing — the easiest way to steal money

- It took 2 months to prepare first attack on card processing.
- First victim – bank in the Kazakhstan. Attackers withdraw $600 thousand.
- After first success they started to attack other clients of the card processing vendor as used in Kazakhstan bank.
- Cobalt attempted to steal €25 mln just in one attack on a Central European bank via Card processing. Infection was through Supply chain.

Scheme description

- Getting access to computers of Card processing operators in the bank.
- Legally open bank cards in the same bank or buy new cards on dark market (usually about 30 cards).
- Remove or increase withdraw limits.
- Remove overdraft limits (even for debit cards).
- Cash out using these cards in other countries

Reason to shift on Card processing

- After arrest of mules in Taiwan, Romania, Russia, the safety of mules became a priority for them.
- No need of complicated scheme of money laundering. Mules always get clean cash. Attacker need only several cards of attacked bank to accomplish fraud.
- Withdrawing money in another country provides time to mules. Bank’s security service could not quickly contact the police, get records from video surveillance cameras.
Payment gateways

First episode

- March 2017 first spear phishing campaign behalf of moneta.ru targeting 4 Russian and 4 Ukrainian e-wallet companies.
- To accomplish attack threat actors created 2 simple tools: FileLogger.exe and Ugw.exe.
- FileLogger.exe – track new files in the specified folder and copy content of new files into the log file.
- Ugw.exe – generate transactions to automate theft process.
Payment gateways

First episode

- To steal money the attacker needs to generate thousands of transactions for small sums. Very hard to stop without disrupting service and also hard to return stolen funds.
- Ugw.exe - generates transactions to automate the theft process.
- Ugw.exe reads file terminals.txt generated by the attackers. This file contains Terminal IDs, on behalf of whom requests for transfer are made.
- Here the attackers specified phone, cards numbers and the totals for transfers and press Generate transaction button.
- The output of Ugw.exe are files with transaction details in the right format. These files were put into the In folder and processed by the payment gateway.
- Total loss was about $2 mln.
Payment gateways: Cooperation with Anunak (Carbanak) gang

**Carbanak / Anunak**
- First attack recorded payment gateway attack was conducted in 2014 by Anunak (Carbanak) gang.
- In that attack Anunak (Carnabak) used a SSH-backdoor that they compiled right on the compromised Linux servers.

**Second episode**
- In September 2017 another e-wallet company was hacked and robbed by Cobalt.
- The attack scheme was similar to the first episode with standard Cobalt toolkit.
- After successful theft the attack did not stop. The attacker got access to 2 development servers and installed the SSH-backdoor on them.
- SSH-backdoors had identical RSA private and public keys, but different C2 domains.
- The domain hagaipipko.net and RSA keys are identical to those we saw in 2014 during Carbanak incident response.
- SSH backdoor and Cobalt Strike beacon C2 addresses were in the same subnets 89.37.226.0/24 and 190.123.35.0/24 and 190.123.36.0/24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SSH backdoor C2-address</th>
<th>Registration date</th>
<th>Expiration date</th>
<th>SSH backdoor IP-address</th>
<th>Cobalt Strike C2-address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hagaipipko.net</td>
<td>2014-08-14</td>
<td>2018-08-14</td>
<td>190.123.36.162</td>
<td>190.123.35.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>javacdnupdate.com</td>
<td>2017-10-12</td>
<td>2018-10-12</td>
<td>89.37.226.10</td>
<td>89.37.226.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>89.35.178.108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Attacks on Supply chain

Supply chain attack – infected system integrators, software vendors, service providers.

New vector to deliver malware
- In February 2017 Cobalt successfully compromised a Supply chain company (IT Integrator).
- They used their mail server to send spear phishing, targeting companies in Russia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and their local offices in other countries (Turkey, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore).
- Within the next 9 months Cobalt compromised at least 3 more “Supply chain” companies. One of them in Ukraine and other in Russia.
- In August they compromised a Russian Telecom company. The attack was stopped and it is unclear what was the final goal of attackers.

Unused potential
- In all cases they used the mail server of the compromised company to send spear phishing against their clients.
- We did not detect any watering hole attacks, even when attackers compromised the victim network.
- Attackers did not use the software of the compromised vendor to deliver malware.
- Only in one instance did Cobalt use the infrastructure of the compromised IT integrator, (remote channels to their clients) to infect them.
Spear phishing

**Mailing tool**
- Since 2016 until present Cobalt uses the same tool to send emails – alexusMailer 2.0 aka iPosylka developed by Russian speaking developer in 2011. [https://github.com/AlexusBlack/alexusMailer-2](https://github.com/AlexusBlack/alexusMailer-2)
- Only since November of 2017 have Cobalt started to configure SPF and DKIM on mail servers.

**Attachments**
- Documents: DOC, XLS, RTF, LNK, HTA
- Executables: EXE, SCR
- Documents and executables in archives with passwords and without them.
- Only in December 2017 they used email with link on malicious Java applet rather than attachment.

**Exploit builder**
- Ancalog Exploit Builder aka OffensiveWare Multi Exploit Builder (OMEB) – generates malicious files DOC, JS, HTA, PDF, VBS and CHM. Advertising on forums and sites like ancalog.tech, ancalog.win, offensiveware.com
- Microsoft Word Intruder (MWI) developed by Russian speaking developer with nickname Object since 2010. Generates DOC files that can contain up to 4 exploits at the same time.
Spear phishing

Email body and the Decoy documents

- Only since May of 2017 Cobalt started to used well prepared decoy documents. Before that, if victims opened an attached document it would not display any content, which can be construed as suspicious.

- Absence of decoy documents helped Cobalt on occasion, because users resent malicious email to other users to check if document will open.

- In most cases the email body does not have a well written text. Usually it is one or two sentences and signature is absent.

- Only in Supply chain attacks did Cobalt copy original emails of compromised companies with well written text and signatures.
**Lateral movement**
- For network scanning they use: SoftPerfect Network Scanner, Eternal Blues, EternalPunch 0.3.0
- Malware provisioning for corporate anti-virus management software
- Manual dump of the network administrator’s keepass database
- **Mimikatz** to extract plaintexts passwords, hash, PIN code and kerberos tickets from memory.
- Searched for passwords stored in Active Directory group policies by exploiting the **MS14-025**: Vulnerability in Group Policy Preferences

**Persistence**
- For persistence Cobalt use servers with long uptime.
- Creating services and autorun keys to launch powershell.exe and passing arguments to start CobaltStrike stager.
- Create local account **support452** with RDP permissions.
- Adding new C2 servers in the development of the attack.
- Create tasks in Windows Task Scheduler +3 weeks after thefts to launch CobaltStrike stager with future C2 server.

**Remote control**
- VNC built into CobaltStrike
- Radmin, AmmyAdmin, TeamViewer
- RPIVOT (reverse socks 4 proxy) precompiled with py2exe.
- Use of corporate RDP and VPN servers that allows remote access.
PetrWrap

Ransomware to hide traces

- In February 2017 Cobalt compromised a small Russian bank. Using corporate antivirus management software, they launched file out.exe

- Out.exe – was the new ransomware PetrWrap. It is modified version of well known Petya ransomware later used in NotPetya attack (otherwise unrelated).

- After the encryption process was completed, a message is displayed that encryption was performed, with the requirement to contact the attacker via email razlokyou@tutanota.com
Reconnaissance & JS – backdoor 2.0

Reconnaissance – backdoor

- In May of 2017 Cobalt spear phishing with PCI DSS related attachments exploited CVE-2017-0199.
- After exploitation a new test backdoor launched on the system. Testing is also indicated by the internal name of the module test.dll.
- **Test.dll** is a reconnaissance module. It was able to collect information like:
  - Operating system
  - User
  - Active processes
  - List of files in %USER%\Desktop\n  - Create screenshots
  - Cookies and browser history
- Additionally it supported command:
  - Download files
  - Remove itself

JS – backdoor 2.0

- In July Cobalt use new JS-backdoor v2.0 in attacks on the English-speaking countries.
- After exploitation malicious DLL will download JS-backdoor. But prior to download this DLL will check if current year = 2017 and the process name that launched it. If checks fail, the JS-backdoor will not be downloaded.
- Execution scheme used by the malware is previously described by researcher Casey Smith @subTee and help them to successfully bypass whitelist protection.
- JS-backdoor supports these commands:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>d&amp;exec</td>
<td>Download and execute the file</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more_eggs</td>
<td>Download the new SCT script</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gtfo</td>
<td>Self remove from the system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more_onion</td>
<td>Run a new SCT script</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more_power</td>
<td>Run an arbitrary command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
InfoStealer v. 0.2

**Short history**

- In early September, Cobalt sends out the RTF document "New Business Venture.doc" with the vulnerability exploit CVE-2017-0199 in MS Word.
- As a result of the exploit the x1.db file was downloaded - the executable DLL.
- DLL implemented JS backdoor functionality in the executable, but without the ability to download and execute.
- This Info Stealer was version 0.2. It is completely memory-hosted and does not leave traces on the file system.

**Functionality**

- It is executed only if the file was started by the `odbcconf.exe` process.
- After start, start cycled delays to avoid sandbox detection. Total delay was about 10 minutes.
- Backdoor collects and sends data about the serial number of the system volume, PC name, user name, AV system availability, OS version, OS bit, malware version.
- Extract user data, including passwords from: Mail clients, Browsers, SSH/FTP clients.
- Collect data from the Address book.
- Collect from the system the list of visited web pages.

November 21, in the public GitHub repository Embedi published Proof of Concept for this vulnerability https://github.com/embedi/CVE-2017-11882

Just few hours later, Cobalt began a massive phishing campaign to financial institutions that contained a malicious document that was not detected by antivirus solutions.

A few hours later, anti-virus solutions began to detect the file as malicious.

The same day, Cobalt modified document and continue spear phishing campaign behalf of Central bank of Russia and SWIFT Alliance.
Java applet and 2-step infection

Infection process

- In December of 2017 Cobalt sent spear phishing with link to new malicious Java applet.
- Java-applet is the Dropper that extracts and launch files. In 2-step infection Dropper contains Downloader program. In later attacks, the Java applet immediately loaded and ran Cobalt beacon from C2 server.
- First Downloader downloads from remote host main module responsible for download Screenshorter and ProcessChecker and communication with C2 server.
- In February they stopped using Java.

Spear phishing with link to signed.jar.
No attachments.

**signed.jar** – Dropper that extracts main.dll or main64.dll. Then launch it in the context of JAVA machine.

**Main.dll** – simple downloader. It download and launch main trojan – int.dll

**Int.dll** – download and launch another modules. Get data from modules and send it on C2.

**Main module** can receive command to download and execute Cobalt Strike Beacon.

**Main.dll**

- 1. Screenshot module
- 2. Process info collection module

**Main module**

- 1. Screenshot module
- 2. Process info collection module

**Main module**

- First Downloader downloads from remote host main module responsible for download Screenshorter and ProcessChecker and communication with C2 server.
- In February they stopped using Java.
Questions?

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